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Two fundamental axioms in social choice theory are consistency with respect
to a variable electorate and consistency with respect to components of similar
alternatives. In the context of traditional non-probabilistic social choice, these
axioms are incompatible with each other. We show that in the context of prob-
abilistic social choice, these axioms uniquely characterize a function proposed
by Fishburn (Rev. Econ. Stud., 51(4), 683–692, 1984). Fishburn’s function
returns so-called maximal lotteries, i.e., lotteries that correspond to optimal
mixed strategies in the symmetric zero-sum game induced by the pairwise ma-
jority margins. Maximal lotteries are guaranteed to exist due to von Neumann’s
Minimax Theorem, are almost always unique, and can be efficiently computed
using linear programming.
1. Introduction
Many important properties in the theory of social choice concern the consistency of aggre-
gation functions under varying parameters. What happens if two electorates are merged?
How should an aggregation function deal with components of similar alternatives? How
should choices from overlapping agendas be related to each other? These considerations
have led to a number of consistency axioms that these functions should ideally satisfy.1
Unfortunately, social choice theory is rife with impossibility results which have revealed
the incompatibility of many of these properties. Young and Levenglick (1978), for exam-
ple, have pointed out that every social choice function that satisfies Condorcet-consistency
violates consistency with respect to variable electorates. On the other hand, it follows from
results by Young (1975) and Laslier (1996) that all Pareto-optimal social choice functions
1Consistency conditions have found widespread acceptance well beyond social choice theory and feature
prominently in the characterizations of various concepts in mathematical economics such as proportional
representation rules (Balinski and Young, 1978), Nash’s bargaining solution (Lensberg, 1988), the Shap-
ley value (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989), and Nash equilibrium (Peleg and Tijs, 1996). Young (1994) and
Thomson (2014) provide excellent overviews and give further examples.
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that are consistent with respect to variable electorates are inconsistent with respect to
components of similar alternatives.
The main result of this paper is that, in the context of probabilistic social choice, consis-
tency with respect to variable electorates and consistency with respect to components of
similar alternatives uniquely characterize an appealing probabilistic social choice function,
which furthermore satisfies Condorcet-consistency. Probabilistic social choice functions
yield lotteries over alternatives (rather than sets of alternatives) and were first formally
studied by Zeckhauser (1969), Fishburn (1972), and Intriligator (1973). Perhaps one of
the best known results in this context is Gibbard’s characterization of strategyproof prob-
abilistic social choice functions (Gibbard, 1977). An important corollary of Gibbard’s
characterization, attributed to Hugo Sonnenschein, is that random dictatorships are the
only strategyproof and ex post efficient probabilistic social choice functions. In random
dictatorships, one of the voters is picked at random and his most preferred alternative is
implemented as the social choice. While Gibbard’s theorem might seem as an extension of
classic negative results on strategyproof non-probabilistic social choice functions (Gibbard,
1973; Satterthwaite, 1975), it is in fact much more positive (see also Barbera`, 1979). In
contrast to deterministic dictatorships, the uniform random dictatorship (henceforth, ran-
dom dictatorship), in which every voter is picked with the same probability, enjoys a high
degree of fairness and is in fact used in many subdomains of social choice that are concerned
with the fair assignment of objects to agents (see, e.g., Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998;
Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2004; Che and Kojima, 2010; Budish et al., 2013).
Summary of Results
In this paper, we consider two consistency axioms, non-probabilistic versions of which have
been widely studied in the literature. The first one, population-consistency, requires that,
whenever two disjoint electorates agree on a lottery, this lottery should also be chosen by
the union of both electorates. The second axiom, composition-consistency, requires that
the probability that an alternative receives is unaffected by introducing new variants of
another alternative. Alternatives are variants of each other if they form a component, i.e.,
they bear the same relationship to all other alternatives. On top of that, composition-
consistency prescribes that the probability of an alternative within a component should be
directly proportional to the probability that the alternative receives when the component
is considered in isolation. Apart from their intuitive appeal, these axioms can be motivated
by the desire to prevent a central planner from strategically partitioning the electorate into
subelectorates or by deliberately introducing similar variants of alternatives, respectively.
Our first result shows that there is no non-probabilistic social choice function that satisfies
both axioms simultaneously. We then move to probabilistic social choice and prove that
the only probabilistic social choice function satisfying these properties is the function that
returns all maximal lotteries for a given preference profile. Maximal lotteries, which were
proposed independently by Fishburn (1984) and other authors, are equivalent to mixed
maximin strategies of the symmetric zero-sum game given by the pairwise majority mar-
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gins. Whenever there is an alternative that is preferred to any other alternative by some
majority of voters (a so-called Condorcet winner), the lottery that assigns probability 1 to
this alternative is the unique maximal lottery. In other words, maximal lotteries satisfy
Condorcet-consistency. At the same time, maximal lotteries satisfy population-consistency
which has been identified by Young (1974a), Nitzan and Rubinstein (1981), Saari (1990b),
and others as the defining property of Borda’s scoring rule. As such, the characterization
can be seen as one possible resolution of the historic dispute between the founding fathers
of social choice theory, the Chevalier de Borda and the Marquis de Condorcet, which dates
back to the 18th century.2
Random dictatorship, the most prevalent probabilistic social choice function, satisfies
population-consistency, but fails to satisfy composition-consistency. For this reason, we
also consider a weaker version of composition-consistency called cloning-consistency, which
is satisfied by random dictatorship, and provide an alternative characterization of maximal
lotteries using population-consistency, cloning-consistency, and Condorcet-consistency (see
Remark 5).
Acceptability of Social Choice Lotteries
Clearly, allowing lotteries as outcomes for high-stakes political elections such as those for
the U.S. presidency would be highly controversial and considered by many a failure of
deliberative democracy. If, on the other hand, a small group of people repeatedly votes
on where to hold their next meeting, randomization would likely be more acceptable and
perhaps even desirable. The use of lotteries for the selection of officials interestingly goes
back to the world’s first democracy in Athens where it was widely regarded as a principal
characteristic of democracy (Headlam, 1933). It has also been early observed in the social
choice literature that “unattractive social choices may result whenever lotteries are not
allowed to compete. [. . . ] Refusal to entertain lotteries on alternatives can lead to outcomes
that to many appear to be inequitable and perhaps even inefficient” (Zeckhauser, 1969).3
In contemporary research, probabilistic social choice has gained increasing interest in both
social choice (see, e.g., Ehlers et al., 2002; Bogomolnaia et al., 2005; Chatterji et al., 2014)
and political science (see, e.g., Goodwin, 2005; Dowlen, 2009; Stone, 2011).
2In this sense, our main theorem is akin to the characterization of Kemeny’s rule by Young and Levenglick
(1978). Young and Levenglick considered social preference functions, i.e., functions that return sets of
rankings of alternatives, and showed that Kemeny’s rule is characterized by strong versions of population-
consistency and Condorcet-consistency.
Interestingly, all three rules—Borda’s rule, Kemeny’s rule, and maximal lotteries—maximize aggregate
score in a well-defined sense. For maximal lotteries, this is the case because they maximize social
welfare according to the canonical skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions representing the
voters ordinal preferences (Brandl et al., 2016). SSB utility theory goes back to Fishburn (1982) and is
a generalization of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory.
3It is interesting to note that the “intransitivity difficulties” that Zeckhauser (1969) examines in the
context of probabilistic social choice disappear when replacing majority rule with expected majority
rule. This directly leads to Fishburn’s definition of maximal lotteries.
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Whether lotteries are socially acceptable depends on many factors, only some of which
are based on formal arguments. In our view, two important factors are (i) the effective
degree of randomness and (ii) risk aversion on behalf of the voters.
As to (i), it is easily seen that certain cases call for randomization or other means of
tie-breaking. For example, if there are two alternatives, a and b, and exactly half of the
voters prefer a while the other half prefers b, there is no deterministic way of selecting a
single alternative without violating basic fairness conditions. There are several possibilities
to extend the notion of a tied outcome to three or more alternatives. An important
question in this context is whether ties are a rare exception or a common phenomenon.
A particularly rigorous and influential extension due to Condorcet declares a tie in the
absence of a pairwise majority winner. According to Condorcet, it is the intransitivity
of social preferences, as exhibited in the Condorcet paradox, that leads to situations in
which there is no unequivocal winner. As it turns out, maximal lotteries are degenerate
if and only if there is a Condorcet winner. Our main result thus establishes that the
degree of randomness entailed by our axioms is precisely in line with Condorcet’s view of
equivocality. Interestingly, there is strong empirical and experimental evidence that most
real-world preference profiles for political elections do admit a Condorcet winner (see, e.g.,
Regenwetter et al., 2006; Laslier, 2010; Gehrlein and Lepelley, 2011).4 Maximal lotteries
only randomize in the less likely case of cyclical majorities. Brandt and Seedig (2014)
specifically analyzed the support of maximal lotteries and found that the average support
size is less than four under various distributional assumptions and up to 30 alternatives.
By contrast, random dictatorship randomizes over all alternatives in almost all elections.
As to (ii), risk aversion is strongly related to the frequency of preference aggregation.
If an aggregation procedure is not frequently repeated, the law of large numbers does not
apply and risk-averse voters might prefer a sure outcome to a lottery whose expectation
they actually prefer to the sure outcome. Hence, probabilistic social choice seems partic-
ularly suitable for novel preference aggregation settings that have been made possible by
technological advance. The Internet, in particular, allows for much more frequent pref-
erence aggregation than traditional paper-and-pencil elections. In recurring randomized
elections with a fixed set of alternatives, voters need not resubmit their preferences for
4 Analytical results for the likelihood of Condorcet winners are typically based on the simplistic “im-
partial culture” model, which assumes that every preference relation is equally likely. According to
this model, a Condorcet winner, for example, exists with a probability of at least 63% when there are
seven alternatives (Fishburn, 1973). The impartial culture model is considered highly unrealistic and
Regenwetter et al. (2006) argued that it significantly underestimates the probability of Condorcet win-
ners. Gehrlein and Lepelley (2011) summarized 37 empirical studies from 1955 to 2009 and concluded
that “there is a possibility that Condorcet’s Paradox might be observed, but that it probably is not a
widespread phenomenon.” Laslier (2010) and Brandt and Seedig (2014) reported concrete probabilities
for the existence of Condorcet winners under various distributional assumptions using computer simu-
lations. A common observation in these studies is that the probability of a Condorcet winner generally
decreases with increasing number of alternatives. For example, Brandt and Seedig found that, for 15
voters and a spatial distribution of preferences that is commonly used in political science, the probability
of a Condorcet winner ranges from 98% (for three alternatives) to 59% (for 50 alternatives).
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every election; rather preferences can be stored and only changed if desired. For example,
maximal lotteries could help a group of coworkers with the daily decision of where to have
lunch without requiring them to submit their preferences every day. Another example are
automatic music broadcasting systems, such as Internet radio stations or software DJs,
that decide which song should be played next based on the preferences of the listeners.
In contrast to traditional deterministic solutions to these problems such as sequential dic-
tatorships, the repeated execution of lotteries is a memoryless process that guarantees ex
ante fairness after any number of elections.
Finally, it should be noted that the lotteries returned by probabilistic social choice func-
tions do not necessarily have to be interpreted as probability distributions. They can,
for instance, also be seen as fractional allocations of divisible objects such as time shares
or monetary budgets. The axioms considered in this paper are equally natural for these
interpretations as they are for the probabilistic interpretation.
2. Preliminaries
Let U be an infinite universal set of alternatives. The set of agendas from which alternatives
are to be chosen is the set of finite and non-empty subsets of U , denoted by F(U). The set
of all linear (i.e., complete, transitive, and antisymmetric) preference relations over some
set A ∈ F(U) will be denoted by L(A).
For some finite set X, we denote by ∆(X) the set of all probability distributions with
rational values overX. A (fractional) preference profileR for a given agenda A is an element
of ∆(L(A)), which can be associated with the (|A|!−1)-dimensional (rational) unit simplex.
We interpret R(<) as the fraction of voters with preference relation < ∈ L(A). Preference
profiles are depicted by tables in which each column represents a preference relation < with
R(<) > 0. The table below shows an example profile on three alternatives.5
1/2 1/3 1/6
a a b
b c c
c b a
(Example 1)
The set of all preference profiles for a fixed agenda A is denoted by R|A and R is defined
as the set of all preference profiles, i.e., R =
⋃
A∈F(U)R|A. For B ⊆ A and R ∈ R|A, R|B
is the restriction of R to alternatives in B, i.e., for all < ∈ L(B),
R|B(<) =
∑
<′∈L(A) : <⊆<′
R(<′).
5Our representation of preference profiles implicitly assumes that aggregation functions are anonymous
(i.e., all voters are treated identically) and homogeneous (i.e., duplication of the electorate does not affect
the outcome). Similar models (sometimes even assuming a continuum of voters) have for example been
considered by Young (1974b, 1975), Young and Levenglick (1978), Saari (1995), Dasgupta and Maskin
(2008), Che and Kojima (2010), and Budish and Cantillion (2012).
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For all x, y ∈ A, R(x, y) = R|{x,y}({(x, y)}) is the fraction of voters who prefer x to y
(the set {(x, y)} represents the preference relation on two alternatives with x ≻ y). In
Example 1, R(a, b) = 5/6.
Elements of ∆(A) are called lotteries and will be written as convex combinations of
alternatives. If p is a lottery, px is the probability that p assigns to alternative x.
A probabilistic social choice function (PSCF) f is an (upper hemi-) continuous function
that, for any agenda A ∈ F(U), maps a preference profile R ∈ R|A to a convex subset
of ∆(A).6 A PSCF is thus a collection of mappings from high-dimensional simplices to
low-dimensional simplices. Two further properties that we demand from any PSCF are
unanimity and decisiveness. Unanimity states that in the case of one voter and two al-
ternatives, the preferred alternative should be chosen with probability 1.7 Since we only
consider fractional preference profiles, this amounts to for all x, y ∈ U and R ∈ R|{x,y},
f(R) = {x} whenever R(x, y) = 1. (unanimity)
Decisiveness requires that the set of preference profiles where f is multi-valued is negligible
in the sense that for all A ∈ F(U),
{R ∈ R|A : |f(R)| = 1} is dense in R|A. (decisiveness)
In other words, for every preference profile that yields multiple lotteries, there is an arbi-
trarily close preference profile that only yields a single lottery.
Probabilistic social choice functions considered in the literature usually satisfy these con-
ditions and are therefore well-defined PSCFs. For example, consider random dictatorship
(RD), in which one voter is picked uniformly at random and his most-preferred alternative
is returned. Formally, RD returns the unique lottery, which is determined by multiplying
fractions of voters with their respective top choices, i.e., for all A ∈ F(U) and R ∈ R|A,
RD(R) =

 ∑
<∈L(A)
R(<) ·max
<
(A)

 , (random dictatorship)
where max<(A) denotes the unique alternative x such that x < y for all y ∈ A. For the
preference profile R given in Example 1,
RD(R) = {5/6 a+ 1/6 b}.
RD is single-valued and therefore trivially decisive and convex-valued. It is also easily seen
that RD satisfies unanimity and continuity and thus constitutes a PSCF.
6Fishburn (1973, pp. 248–249) argued that the set of lotteries returned by a probabilistic social choice
function should be convex because it would be unnatural if two lotteries are socially acceptable while a
randomization between them is not (see also Fishburn, 1972, p. 201).
7This is the only condition we impose that actually interprets the preference relations. It is equivalent to
ex post efficiency for agendas of size 2 and is slightly weaker than Young’s faithfulness (Young, 1974a).
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A useful feature of our definition of PSCFs is that traditional set-valued social choice
functions (SCFs) (also known as social choice correspondences) can be seen as a special
case, namely as those PSCFs that map every preference profile R ∈ R|A on some agenda
A ∈ F(U) to ∆(X) for some X ⊆ A. Such PSCFs will be called (non-probabilistic) SCFs.
3. Population-consistency and Composition-consistency
The consistency conditions we consider are generalizations of the corresponding conditions
for SCFs, i.e., the axioms coincide with their non-probabilistic counterparts.
The first axiom relates choices from varying electorates to each other. More precisely, it
requires that whenever a lottery is chosen simultaneously by two electorates, this lottery
is also chosen by the union of both electorates. For example, consider the two preference
profiles R′ and R′′ given below.
1/2 1/2
a b
b c
c a
R′
1/2 1/2
a b
c c
b a
R′′
1/4 1/4 1/2
a a b
b c c
c b a
1/2R′ + 1/2R′′
(Example 2)
Population-consistency then demands that any lottery that is chosen in both R′ and R′′
(say, 1/2 a+1/2 b) also has to be chosen when both preference profiles are merged. Formally,
a PSCF satisfies population-consistency if for all A ∈ F(U), R′, R′′ ∈ R|A, and any convex
combination R of R′ and R′′, i.e., R = λR′ + (1− λ)R′′ for some λ ∈ [0, 1],
f(R′) ∩ f(R′′) ⊆ f(R). (population-consistency)
Population-consistency is arguably one of the most natural axioms for variable electorates
and is usually considered in a slightly stronger version, known as reinforcement or simply
consistency, where the inclusion in the equation above is replaced with equality whenever
the left-hand side is non-empty (see also Remark 4). Note that population-consistency is
merely a statement about abstract sets of outcomes, which makes no reference to lotteries
whatsoever. It was first considered independently by Smith (1973), Young (1974a), and
Fine and Fine (1974) and features prominently in the characterization of scoring rules
by Smith (1973) and Young (1975). Population-consistency and its variants have found
widespread acceptance in the social choice literature (see, e.g., Young, 1974b; Fishburn,
1978; Young and Levenglick, 1978; Saari, 1990a, 1995; Myerson, 1995; Congar and Merlin,
2012).
The second axiom prescribes how PSCFs should deal with decomposable preference pro-
files. For two agendas A,B ∈ F(U), B ⊆ A is a component in R ∈ R|A if the alternatives
in B are adjacent in all preference relations that appear in R, i.e., for all a ∈ A \ B and
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b, b′ ∈ B, a < b if and only if a < b′ for all < ∈ L(A) with R(<) > 0. Intuitively, the
alternatives in B can be seen as variants or clones of the same alternative because they
have exactly the same relationship to all alternatives that are not in B. For example,
consider the following preference profile R in which B = {b, b′} constitutes a component.
1/3 1/6 1/2
a a b
b′ b b′
b b′ a
R
1/2 1/2
a b
b a
R|A′
1/3 2/3
b′ b
b b′
R|B
(Example 3)
The ‘essence’ of R is captured by R|A′ , where A
′ = {a, b} contains only one of the cloned al-
ternatives. It seems reasonable to demand that a PSCF should assign the same probability
to a (say, 1/2) independently of the number of clones of b and the internal relationship be-
tween these clones. This condition will be called cloning-consistency and was first proposed
by Tideman (1987) (see also Zavist and Tideman, 1989). Its origins can be traced back to
earlier, more general, decision-theoretic work by Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) and Maskin
(1979) where it is called deletion of repetitious states as well as early work on majoritarian
SCFs by Moulin (1986). For a formal definition of cloning-consistency, let A′, B ∈ F(U)
and A = A′ ∪ B such that A′ ∩B = {b}. Then, a PSCF f satisfies cloning-consistency if,
for all R ∈ R|A such that B is a component in R,{
(px)x∈A\B : p ∈ f(R)
}
=
{
(px)x∈A\B : p ∈ f(R|A′)
}
.
When having a second look at Example 3, it may appear strange that cloning-consistency
does not impose any restrictions on the probabilities that f assigns to the clones. While
clones behave completely identical with respect to uncloned alternatives, they are not
indistinguishable from each other. It seems that the relationships between clones (R|B)
should be taken into account as well. For example, one would expect that f assigns more
probability to b than to b′ because two thirds of the voters prefer b to b′. An elegant and
mathematically appealing way to formalize this intuition is to require that the probabilities
of the clones b and b′ are directly proportional to the probabilities that f assigns to these
alternatives when restricting the preference profile to the component {b, b′}. This condition,
known as composition-consistency, is due to Laffond et al. (1996) and was studied in detail
for majoritarian SCFs (see, e.g., Laslier, 1996, 1997; Brandt, 2011; Brandt et al., 2011;
Horan, 2013).8
For a formal definition of composition-consistency, let p ∈ ∆(A′) and q ∈ ∆(B) and
define
(p×b q)x =
{
px if x ∈ A \B,
pbqx if x ∈ B.
8More generally, modular decompositions of discrete structures have found widespread applications in
operations research and combinatorial optimization (see, e.g., Mo¨hring, 1985).
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The operator ×b is extended to sets of lotteries X ⊆ ∆(A
′) and Y ⊆ ∆(B) by applying it
to all pairs of lotteries in X × Y , i.e., X ×b Y = {p×b q ∈ ∆(A) : p ∈ X and q ∈ Y }.
Then, a PSCF f satisfies composition-consistency if for all R ∈ R|A such that B is a
component in R,
f(R|A′)×b f(R|B) = f(R). (composition-consistency)
In Example 3 above, 1/2 a + 1/2 b ∈ f(R|A′), 2/3 b + 1/3 b
′ ∈ f(R|B), and composition-
consistency would imply that 1/2 a+ 1/3 b+ 1/6 b′ ∈ f(R).
4. Non-probabilistic Social Choice
In the context of SCFs (i.e., PSCFs that only return the convex hull of degenerate lot-
teries), there is some friction between population-consistency and composition-consistency.
In fact, the conflict between these notions can be traced back to the well-documented
dispute between the pioneers of social choice theory, the Chevalier de Borda and the Mar-
quis de Condorcet (see, e.g., Black, 1958; Young, 1988, 1995; McLean and Hewitt, 1994).
Borda proposed a score-based voting rule—Borda’s rule—that can be axiomatically char-
acterized using population-consistency (Young, 1974a). It then turned out that the entire
class of scoring rules (which apart from Borda’s rule also includes plurality rule) is char-
acterized by population-consistency (Smith, 1973; Young, 1974b, 1975). Condorcet, on
the other hand, advocated Condorcet-consistency, which requires that an SCF selects a
Condorcet winner whenever one exists. As Condorcet already pointed out, Borda’s rule
fails to be Condorcet-consistent. Worse, Young and Levenglick (1978) even showed that no
Condorcet-consistent SCF satisfies population-consistency (the defining property of scor-
ing rules).9 Laslier (1996), on the other hand, showed that no Pareto-optimal rank-based
rule—a generalization of scoring rules—satisfies composition-consistency while this prop-
erty is satisfied by various Condorcet-consistent SCFs (Laffond et al., 1996). One of the
few SCFs that satisfies both properties is the rather indecisive Pareto rule (which returns
all alternatives that are not Pareto-dominated). Since our definition of PSCFs already
incorporates a certain degree of decisiveness, we obtain the following impossibility. (The
proofs of all theorems are deferred to the Appendix.)
Theorem 1. There is no SCF that satisfies population-consistency and composition-
consistency.10
In light of this result, it is perhaps surprising that, for probabilistic social choice, both
axioms are not only mutually compatible but even uniquely characterize a PSCF.
9Theorem 2 by Young and Levenglick (1978) actually uses the strong variant of population-consistency,
but their proof also holds for population-consistency as defined in this paper.
10Theorem 1 still holds when replacing composition-consistency with the weaker condition of cloning-
consistency.
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5. Characterization of Maximal Lotteries
Maximal lotteries were first considered by Kreweras (1965) and independently proposed
and studied in more detail by Fishburn (1984). Interestingly, maximal lotteries or variants
thereof have been rediscovered again by economists (Laffond et al., 1993b),11 mathemati-
cians (Fisher and Ryan, 1995), political scientists (Felsenthal and Machover, 1992), and
computer scientists (Rivest and Shen, 2010).12
In order to define maximal lotteries, we need some notation. For A ∈ F(U), R ∈ R|A,
x, y ∈ A, the entries MR(x, y) of the majority margin matrix MR denote the difference
between the fraction of voters who prefer x to y and the fraction of voters who prefer y
to x, i.e.,
MR(x, y) = R(x, y)−R(y, x).
Thus, MR is skew-symmetric and MR ∈ [−1, 1]
A×A. A (weak) Condorcet winner is an
alternative x that is maximal in A according to MR in the sense that MR(x, y) ≥ 0 for all
y ∈ A. If MR(x, y) > 0 for all y ∈ A \ {x}, x is called a strict Condorcet winner. A PSCF
is Condorcet-consistent if x ∈ f(R) whenever x is a Condorcet winner in R.
It is well known from the Condorcet paradox that maximal elements may fail to exist. As
shown by Kreweras (1965) and Fishburn (1984), this drawback can, however, be remedied
by considering lotteries over alternatives. For two lotteries p, q ∈ ∆(A), the majority
margin can be extended to its bilinear form pTMRq, the expected majority margin. The
set of maximal lotteries is then defined as the set of “probabilistic Condorcet winners.”
11Laffond et al. (1993b, 1996), Dutta and Laslier (1999), and others have explored the support of maximal
lotteries, called the bipartisan set or the essential set, in some detail. Laslier (2000) has characterized
the essential set using monotonicity, Fishburn’s C2, regularity, inclusion-minimality, the strong superset
property, and a variant of composition-consistency.
12Felsenthal and Machover (1992) and Rivest and Shen (2010) also discussed whether maximal lotteries
are suitable for real-world political elections. Rivest and Shen concluded that “[the maximal lotteries
system] is not only theoretically interesting and optimal, but simple to use in practice; it is probably
easier to implement than, say, IRV [instant-runoff voting]. We feel that it can be recommended for
practical use.” Felsenthal and Machover wrote that “an inherent special feature of [maximal lotteries]
is its extensive and essential reliance on probability in selecting the winner [. . . ] Without sufficient
empirical evidence it is impossible to say whether this feature of [maximal lotteries] makes it socially
less acceptable than other majoritarian procedures. It is not at all a question of fairness, for nothing
could be fairer than the use of lottery as prescribed by [maximal lotteries]. The problem is whether
society will accept such an extensive reliance on chance in public decision-making. Different societies
may have differing views about this. For example, it is well known that the free men of ancient Athens
regarded it as quite acceptable to select holders of public office by lot. Clearly, before [the maximal
lotteries system] can be applied in practice, public opinion must first be consulted, and perhaps educated,
on this issue.”
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Formally, for all A ∈ F(U) and R ∈ R|A,
13
ML(R) = {p ∈ ∆(A) : pTMRq ≥ 0 for all q ∈ ∆(A)}. (maximal lotteries)
As an example, consider the preference profile given in Example 1 of Section 2. Alternative
a is a strict Condorcet winner and ML(R) = {a}. This is in contrast to RD(R) = {5/6 a+
1/6 b}, which puts positive probability on any first-ranked alternative no matter how small
the corresponding fraction of voters.
The Minimax Theorem implies that ML(R) is non-empty for all R ∈ R (von Neumann,
1928). In fact, MR can be interpreted as the payoff matrix of a symmetric zero-sum game
and maximal lotteries as the mixed maximin strategies (or Nash equilibrium strategies) of
this game. Hence, maximal lotteries can be efficiently computed via linear programming.
Interestingly, ML(R) is a singleton in almost all cases. In particular, this holds if there is
an odd number of voters (Laffond et al., 1997; Le Breton, 2005). Moreover, we point out in
Appendix C.1 that the set of preference profiles that yield a unique maximal lottery is open
and dense, which implies that the set of profiles with multiple maximal lotteries is nowhere
dense and thus negligible. As a consequence, ML satisfies decisiveness as well as the other
properties we demand from a PSCF (such as unanimity, continuity, and convex-valuedness)
and therefore constitutes a well-defined PSCF.
In contrast to the non-probabilistic case where majority rule is known as the only reason-
able and fair SCF on two alternatives (May, 1952; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2008), there is
an infinite number of such PSCFs even when restricting attention to only two alternatives
(see, e.g., Saunders, 2010). Within our framework of fractional preference profiles, a PSCF
on two alternatives can be seen as a convex-valued continuous correspondence from the unit
interval to itself. Unanimity fixes the function values at the endpoints of the unit interval,
decisiveness requires that the points where the function is multi-valued are isolated, and
population-consistency implies that the function is monotonic. Two natural extreme cases
of functions that meet these requirements are a probabilistic version of simple majority
rule and the proportional lottery (Figure 1).14 Interestingly, these two extreme points are
taken by maximal lotteries and random dictatorship as for all x, y ∈ U and R ∈ R|{x,y},
ML(R) =


{x} if R(x, y) > 1/2,
{y} if R(x, y) < 1/2,
∆({x, y}) otherwise,
and RD(R) = {R(x, y)x +R(y, x) y}.
13Several authors apply the signum function to the entries of MR before computing maximal lotteries.
This is, for example, the case for Kreweras (1965), Felsenthal and Machover (1992), Laffond et al.
(1993a), and Fisher and Ryan (1995). Maximal lotteries as defined in this paper were considered by
Dutta and Laslier (1999), Laslier (2000), and Rivest and Shen (2010). Fishburn (1984) allowed the
application of any odd function to the entries of MR, which covers both variants as special cases.
14Fishburn and Gehrlein (1977) compared these two-alternative PSCFs on the basis of expected voter
satisfaction and found that the simple majority rule outperforms the proportional rule.
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Figure 1: Maximal lotteries and random dictatorship on two-element agendas.
When considering up to three alternatives and additionally taking composition-
consistency into account, any such PSCF coincides with majority rule on two-element
agendas.15 When allowing an arbitrary number of alternatives, the axioms completely
characterize ML.
Theorem 2. A PSCF f satisfies population-consistency and composition-consistency if
and only if f = ML.
The proof of Theorem 2 is rather involved yet quite instructive as it rests on a number of
lemmas that might be of independent interest (see Appendix C). The high-level structure is
as follows. The fact that ML satisfies population-consistency and composition-consistency
follows relatively easily from basic linear algebra.
For the converse direction, we first show that population-consistency and composition-
consistency characterize ML on two-element agendas. For agendas of more than two alter-
natives, we assume that f is a population-consistent and composition-consistent PSCF and
then show that f ⊆ ML and ML ⊆ f . The first statement takes up the bulk of the proof
and is shown by assuming for contradiction that there is a preference profile for which f
yields a lottery that is not maximal. We then identify a set of preference profiles with
full dimension for which f returns the uniform lottery over a fixed subset of at least two
alternatives and which has the uniform profile, i.e., the preference profile in which every
preference relation is assigned the same fraction of voters, in its interior. Along the way
we show that f has to be Condorcet-consistent for all preference profiles that are close to
the uniform profile. It follows that there has to be an ε-ball of profiles around some strict
Condorcet profile (close to the uniform profile), for which f returns the uniform lottery
over a non-singleton subset of alternatives as well as the lottery with probability 1 on the
15This also shows that RD violates composition-consistency, which can be seen in Example 3 in Section 3.
However, RD does satisfy cloning-consistency (see Remark 5).
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Condorcet winner. This contradicts decisiveness. For the inclusion of ML in f , we take
an arbitrary preference profile and an arbitrary vertex of the set of maximal lotteries for
this profile and then construct a sequence of preference profiles that converges to the orig-
inal profile and whose maximal lotteries converge to the specified maximal lottery. From
f ⊆ ML and continuity, we obtain that f has to select this lottery in the original preference
profile. Finally, convexity implies that ML ⊆ f .
6. Remarks
We conclude the paper with a number of remarks.
Remark 1 (Independence of axioms). The axioms used in Theorem 2 are independent
from each other. RD satisfies population-consistency, but violates composition-consistency
(see also Remark 5). The same is true for Borda’s rule. When defining ML3 via the
third power of majority margins (MR(x, y))
3, ML3 satisfies composition-consistency, but
violates population-consistency.16 Also the properties implicit in the definition of PSCFs
are independent. The PSCF that returns all maximal lotteries for the profile in which all
preference relations are reversed violates unanimity but satisfies decisiveness, population-
consistency, and composition-consistency. When not requiring decisiveness, returning all
ex post efficient lotteries is consistent with the remaining axioms.17
Remark 2 (Size of Universe). The proof of Theorem 2 exploits the infinity of the
universe. As stated in the previous remark, ML3 satisfies composition-consistency and
violates population-consistency. However, ML3 does satisfy population-consistency when
there are only up to three alternatives. This implies that the statement of Theorem 2
requires a universe that contains at least four alternatives.
Remark 3 (Uniqueness). The set of profiles in whichML is not single-valued is negligible
in the sense specified in the definition of PSCFs. When extending the set of fractional
profiles to the reals, it can also be shown that maximal lotteries are almost always unique
by using an argument similar to that of Harsanyi (1973a).
Remark 4 (Strong population-consistency). ML does not satisfy the stronger ver-
sion of population-consistency in which the set inclusion is replaced with equality (see
Section 3).18 This can be seen by observing that every lottery is maximal for the union
of any two electorates whose preferences are completely opposed to each other. When
there are at least three alternatives, it is possible to find two such preference profiles
which yield the same unique maximal lottery and strong population-consistency is vio-
lated. However, whenever ML is single-valued (which is almost always the case), strong
16Such variants of ML were already considered by Fishburn (1984). See also Footnote 13.
17Continuity and convexity can also be seen as implicit assumptions. Continuity is needed because the
relative interior of ML satisfies all remaining axioms. Whether convexity is required is open.
18Strong population-consistency is quite demanding. It is for example violated by rather basic functions
such as the Pareto rule.
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population-consistency is equivalent to population-consistency and therefore satisfied by
ML.
Remark 5 (Cloning-consistency and Condorcet-consistency). Requiring cloning-
consistency instead of composition-consistency suffices for the proof of Theorem 2 when ad-
ditionally demanding Condorcet-consistency. It is therefore possible to alternatively char-
acterize ML using population-consistency, cloning-consistency, and Condorcet-consistency.
As above, the axioms are independent from each other. ML3, as defined in Remark 1,
satisfies all axioms except population-consistency. The PSCF that is identical to ML3
for agendas of size 3 and otherwise identical to ML satisfies all axioms except cloning-
consistency. RD satisfies all axioms except Condorcet-consistency.
Remark 6 (Agenda-consistency). ML also satisfies agenda-consistency, which requires
that the set of all lotteries that are chosen from two overlapping agendas should be identical
to the set of lotteries that are chosen from the union of both agendas (and whose support
is contained in both agendas). The inclusion from left to right is known as Sen’s γ or
expansion, whereas the inclusion from right to left is Sen’s α or contraction (Sen, 1971).19
Numerous impossibility results, including Arrow’s well-known theorem, have revealed that
agenda-consistency is prohibitive in non-probabilistic social choice when paired with min-
imal further assumptions such as non-dictatorship and Pareto-optimality (e.g., Sen, 1977,
1986; Campbell and Kelly, 2002).20
Remark 7 (Domains). In contrast to RD , which at least requires that every voter has
a unique top choice, ML does not require the asymmetry, completeness, or even transi-
tivity of individual preferences (and still satisfies population-consistency and composition-
consistency in these more general domains). In the restricted domains of matching and
house allocation, on the other hand, maximal lotteries are known as popular mixed match-
ings (Kavitha et al., 2011) or popular random assignments (Aziz et al., 2013b).
Remark 8 (Efficiency). It has already been observed by Fishburn (1984) that ML is
ex post efficient, i.e., Pareto-dominated alternatives always receive probability zero in all
maximal lotteries. Aziz et al. (2013a) strengthened this statement by showing that ML
even satisfies SD-efficiency (also known as ordinal efficiency) as well as the even stronger
notion of PC -efficiency (see Aziz et al., 2015). While RD also satisfies SD-efficiency, ran-
dom serial dictatorship (the canonical generalization of RD to weak preferences) violates
SD-efficiency (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001; Bogomolnaia et al., 2005).
Remark 9 (Strategyproofness). RD is the only ex post efficient strategyproof PSCF
(Gibbard, 1977). However, RD and ML violate group-strategyproofness (in fact, there
exists no ex post efficient group-strategyproof PSCF). RD and ML satisfy the significantly
weaker notion of ST -group-strategyproofness, which is violated by probabilistic extensions
19Sen’s α actually goes back to Chernoff (1954) and Nash (1950), where it is called independence of irrelevant
alternatives (not to be confused with Arrow’s IIA). We refer to Monjardet (2008) for more details.
20Pattanaik and Peleg (1986) obtained a similar impossibility for probabilistic social choice using an inter-
pretation of Sen’s α that is stronger than ours.
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of most common voting rules (Aziz et al., 2014). A very useful property of ML is that it
cannot be manipulated in all preference profiles that admit a strict Condorcet winner (see
Peyre, 2013).
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APPENDIX
A. Preliminaries
As stated in Section 2, U is an infinite set of alternatives. For convenience we will assume
that N ⊆ U . For n ∈ N, [n] is defined as [n] = {1, . . . , n}. For two sets A and B, let Π(A,B)
denote the set of all bijections from A to B (where Π(A,B) = ∅ if |A| 6= |B|). Let Π(A) =
Π(A,A) be the set of all permutations of A. We will frequently work with profiles in which
alternatives are renamed according to some bijection from one set of alternatives to another.
For all A,B ∈ F(U), < ∈ L(A), and π ∈ Π(A,B), let π(<) = {(π(x), π(y)) : (x, y) ∈ <} ∈
L(B) and, for R ∈ R|A, let π(R) ∈ R|B such that R(<) = (π(R))(π(<)). A well-known
symmetry condition for PSCFs is neutrality, which requires that all alternatives are treated
equally in the sense that renaming alternatives is appropriately reflected in the outcome.
Formally, a PSCF is neutral if
π(f(R)) = f(π(R)) for all A,B ∈ F(U), R ∈ R|A, and π ∈ Π(A,B). (neutrality)
We show that composition-consistency implies neutrality by replacing all alternatives
with components of size 2.
Lemma 1. Every composition-consistent PSCF satisfies neutrality.
Proof. Let f be a composition-consistent PSCF, A,B ∈ F(U), R ∈ R|A, and π ∈ Π(A,B).
We have to show that π(f(R)) = f(π(R)). To this end, let pA ∈ f(R). First, choose
A = {a1, . . . , an} and B = {b1, . . . , bn} such that bi = π(ai) for all i ∈ [n]. Since U is
infinite, there is C = {c1, . . . , cn} ∈ F(U) such that C ∩ A = ∅ and C ∩ B = ∅. Now, let
R′ ∈ R|A∪C such that R′|A = R and {ai, ci} is a component in R′ for all i ∈ [n]. Thus, we
have that pA ∈ f(R′|A). We now apply composition-consistency to ai and the components
{ai, ci} for all i ∈ [n], which by definition implies that
f(R|A)×a1 f(R|{a1,c1})×a2 f(R|{a2,c2}) · · · ×an f(R|{an,cn}) = f(R|A∪C).
Hence, for pAC ∈ f(R|A∪C) we have p
AC
ai +p
AC
ci = p
A
ai for all i ∈ [n]. Applying composition-
consistency analogously to ci and {ai, ci} for all i ∈ [n] yields p
C
ci = p
AC
ai + p
AC
ci = p
A
ai for
all pC ∈ f(R|C) and i ∈ [n]. Finally, let R
′′ ∈ R|B∪C such that R
′′|C = R
′|C and {bi, ci}
is a component in R′′ for all i ∈ [n]. Hence, we have that pC ∈ f(R′′|C). As before, it
follows from composition-consistency that pB ∈ f(R′′|B) where p
B
bi
= pCci for all i ∈ [n].
Notice that pB = π(pA) and B = π(A). Since R′′|B = π(R) by construction of R
′′, we have
pB ∈ f(π(R)). Hence, π(f(R)) ⊆ f(π(R)). The fact that f(π(R)) ⊆ π(f(R)) follows from
application of the above to π(R) and π−1.
The following notation is required for our proofs. For some set X, uni(X) denotes the
uniform distribution over X. In particular, for A ∈ F(U), uni(A) is the uniform lottery
over A, i.e., uni(A) = 1/|A|
∑
x∈A x. The support of a lottery p is the set of all alternatives
21
to which p assigns positive probability, i.e., supp(p) = {x ∈ A : px > 0}. The 1-norm of
x ∈ Qn is denoted by ‖x‖, i.e., ‖x‖ =
∑n
i=1 |xi|. For X ⊆ Q
n, the convex hull conv(X) is
the set of all convex combinations of elements of X, i.e.,
conv(X) =
{
λ1a
1 + · · ·+ λka
k : ai ∈ X,λi ∈ Q≥0,
k∑
i=1
λi = 1
}
.
X is convex if X = conv(X). The affine hull aff(X) is the set of all affine combinations of
elements of X, i.e.,
aff(X) =
{
λ1a
1 + · · ·+ λka
k : ai ∈ X,λi ∈ Q,
k∑
i=1
λi = 1
}
.
X is an affine subspace if X = aff(X). We say that a1, . . . , ak ∈ Qn are affinely independent
if, for all λ1, . . . , λk ∈ Q with
∑k
i=1 λi = 0,
∑k
i=1 λia
i = 0 implies λi = 0 for all i ∈ [k].
The dimension of an affine subspace X, dim(X), is k− 1, where k is the maximal number
of affinely independent vectors in X. The dimension of a set X is the dimension of aff(X).
The linear hull lin(X) is the set of all linear combinations of elements of X, i.e.,
lin(X) =
{
λ1a
1 + · · · + λka
k : ai ∈ X,λi ∈ Q
}
.
Bε(x) = {y ∈ Q
n : ‖x−y‖ < ε} denotes the ε-ball around x ∈ Qn. The interior of X ⊆ Qn
in Y ⊆ Qn is intY (X) = {x ∈ X : Bε(x)∩ Y ⊆ X for some ε > 0}. The closure of X ⊆ Q
n
in Y ⊆ Qn, clY (X), is the set of all limit points of sequences in X which converge in Y ,
i.e., clY (X) = {limk→∞ a
k : (ak)k∈N converges in Y and a
k ∈ X for all k ∈ N}. X is dense
in Y if clY (X) = Y . Alternatively, X is dense at y ∈ Q
n if for every ε > 0 there is x ∈ X
such that ‖x− y‖ < ε. X is dense in Y if X is dense at y for every y ∈ Y .
B. Non-Probabilistic Social Choice
Theorem 1. There is no SCF that satisfies population-consistency and composition-
consistency.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that f is an SCF that satisfies population-consistency and
composition-consistency. Let A = {a, b, c} and consider the profiles R1, . . . , R6 as depicted
below.
1/3 1/3 1/3
a b c
b c a
c a b
R1
1/2 1/2
a c
b b
c a
R2
1/2 1/2
a b
c c
b a
R3
1/2 1/2
b c
a a
c b
R4
1/2 1/2
a b
b c
c a
R5
1/2 1/2
b a
a c
c b
R6
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We claim that ∆({a, b}) ⊆ f(Ri) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}. It follows from neutrality that
f(R1) = ∆(A). Again, by neutrality, f(R2|{a,b}) = ∆({a, b}) and f(R
2|{a,c}) = ∆({a, c}).
Notice that {a, b} is a component in R2. Hence, by composition-consistency,
f(R2) = f(R2|{a,c})×a f(R
2|{a,b}) = ∆({a, c}) ×a ∆({a, b}) = ∆(A).
A similar argument yields f(Ri) = ∆(A) for i = 3, 4. Unanimity implies that f(R5|{b,c}) =
{b} and, by neutrality, we have f(R5|{a,b}) = ∆({a, b}). Furthermore, {b, c} is a component
in R5. Hence, by neutrality and composition-consistency,
f(R5) = f(R5|{a,b})×b f(R
5|{b,c}) = ∆({a, b}) ×b {b} = ∆({a, b}).
Similarly, f(R6) = ∆({a, b}).
Every profile Ri is a vector in the five-dimensional unit simplex R|A in Q
6. The corre-
sponding vectors are depicted below.

R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6

 =


1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0 0
1/2 0 0 0 1/2 0
0 1/2 0 1/2 0 0
0 0 1/2 0 0 1/2
1/2 1/2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1/2 0 1/2


It can be checked that R1, . . . , R6 are affinely independent, i.e., dim({R1, . . . , R6}) =
5. It follows from population-consistency that ∆({a, b}) ⊆ f(R) for every R ∈
conv({R1, . . . , R6}). Hence, {R ∈ R|A : |f(R)| = 1} is not dense in R|A at 1/6R
1 + · · · +
1/6R6, which contradicts decisiveness of f .
C. Probabilistic Social Choice
In this section we prove that every PSCF that satisfies population-consistency and
composition-consistency has to return maximal lotteries. The high-level structure of the
proof is described after Theorem 2 in Section 5.
C.1. ML Satisfies Population-Consistency and Composition-Consistency
We first show that ML is a PSCF that satisfies population-consistency and composition-
consistency. This statement is split into two lemmas.
Lemma 2. ML is a PSCF.
Proof. ML is continuous, since the correspondence that maps a matrix M to the set of
vectors x such that Mx ≥ 0 is (upper-hemi) continuous.
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The fact that f(R) is convex for every R ∈ R follows from convexity of the set of maximin
strategies for all (symmetric) zero-sum games.
ML obviously satisfies unanimity by definition.
ML satisfies decisiveness. Let A ∈ F(U) and R ∈ R|A. It is easy to see that, for every
ε > 0, we can find R′ ∈ Bε(R) ∩ R|A and k ∈ N such that kR
′(x, y) is an odd integer for
all x, y ∈ A with x 6= y. Laffond et al. (1997) have shown that every symmetric zero-sum
game whose off-diagonal entries are odd integers admits a unique Nash equilibrium. Hence,
|f(R′)| = 1 and f is decisive.
Moreover, the set of symmetric zero-sum games with a unique maximin strategy in-
herits openness from the set of all zero-sum games with a unique maximin strategy
(Bohnenblust et al., 1950, pp. 56–58). Hence, the set of profiles with a unique maximal
lottery is open and dense in the set of all profiles and the set of profiles with multiple
maximal lotteries is nowhere dense.
Lemma 3. ML satisfies population-consistency and composition-consistency.
Proof. To simplify notation, for every v ∈ Qn and X ⊆ [n], we denote by vX the restriction
of v to indices in X, i.e., vX = (vi)i∈X .
ML satisfies population-consistency. Let A ∈ F(U), R′, R′′ ∈ R|A, and p ∈ ML(R
′) ∩
ML(R′′). Then, by definition of ML, pTMR′q ≥ 0 and p
TMR′′q ≥ 0 for all q ∈ ∆(A).
Hence, for all λ ∈ [0, 1],
pT (λMR′ + (1− λ)MR′′) q = λ p
TMR′q︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+(1− λ) pTMR′′q︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ 0,
for all q ∈ ∆(A), which implies that p ∈ ML(λR′ + (1− λ)R′′).
ML satisfies composition-consistency. Let A′, B ∈ F(U) such that A′ ∩ B = {b}, A =
A′∪B, and R ∈ R|A such that B is a component in R. To simplify notation, let C = A\B
and M = MR,MA′ = MR|A′ ,MB = MR|B , and MC = MR|C . Notice first that M and MA′
take the following form for some v ∈ QA\B:
M =


MC
| |
v . . . v
| |
− (−vT ) −
MB...
− (−vT ) −


, MA′ =

 MC
|
v
|
− (−vT ) − 0

 .
Let p ∈ ML(R|A′) ×b ML(R|B). Then, there are p
A′ ∈ ML(R|A′) and p
B ∈ ML(R|B)
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such that p = pA
′
×b p
B. Let q ∈ ∆(A). Then,
pTMq = pTCMCqC + ‖pB‖(−v)
T qC + p
T
Cv‖qB‖+ p
T
BMBqB
= (pC , ‖pB‖)
TMA′(qC , ‖qB‖)
T + pTBMBqB
= (pA
′
)TMA′(qC , ‖qB‖)
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+‖pB‖ (p
B)TMBqB︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ 0,
since pA
′
∈ ML(R|A′) and p
B ∈ ML(R|B), respectively. Hence p ∈ ML(R).
For the other direction, let p ∈ ML(R). We have to show that there are pA
′
∈ ML(R|A′)
and pB ∈ ML(R|B) such that p = p
A′ ×b p
B.
First, if ‖pB‖ = 0 let p
A′ = pA′ and p
B ∈ ML(R|B) be arbitrary. Let q ∈ ∆(A
′). Then,
(pA
′
)TMA′q = p
T
CMCqC + p
T
Cvqb = p
TM(q, 0)T ≥ 0,
since p ∈ ML(R). Hence, pA
′
∈ ML(R|A′).
Otherwise, let pA
′
= (pC , ‖pB‖) and p
B = pB/‖pB‖. Let q ∈ ∆(A
′). Then,
(pA
′
)TMA′q = p
T
CMCqC + ‖pB‖(−v)
T qC + p
T
Cvqb
= pTCMCqC + ‖pB‖(−v)
T qC + p
T
Cvqb +
qb
‖pB‖
pTBMBpB︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= pTM(qC ,
qb
‖pB‖
pB)
T ≥ 0.
Hence, pA
′
∈ ML(R|A′). Let q ∈ ∆(B). Then,
‖pB‖
2(pB)TMBq = ‖pB‖p
T
BMBq
= ‖pB‖p
T
BMBq + p
T
CMCpC︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ ‖pB‖(−v)
T pC + ‖pB‖p
T
Cv︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= (pC , pB)
TM(pC , ‖pB‖q) = p
TM(pC , ‖pB‖q) ≥ 0.
Hence, pB ∈ ML(R|B).
C.2. Binary Choice
The basis of our characterization of ML is the special case for agendas of size 2. The
following lemma states that, on two alternatives, whenever a composition-consistent PSCF
returns a non-degenerate lottery, it has to return all lotteries. Interestingly, the proof uses
composition-consistency on three-element agendas, even though the statement itself only
concerns agendas of size 2. In order to simplify notation, define
pλ = λa+ (1− λ)b.
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Lemma 4. Let A = {a, b} and f be a PSCF that satisfies composition-consistency. Then,
for all R ∈ R|A and λ ∈ (0, 1), p
λ ∈ f(R) implies f(R) = ∆(A).
Proof. Let R ∈ R|A and assume p
λ ∈ f(R) for some λ ∈ (0, 1). Define R′ ∈ R|{a,b,c} as
depicted below.
R(a, b) R(b, a)
a c
b b
c a
R′
Notice that R′|A = R and thus, p
λ ∈ f(R′|A). Neutrality implies that λa + (1 − λ)c ∈
f(R′|{a,c}). Since A is a component in R
′, we have λpλ+(1−λ)c ∈ f(R′|{a,c})×a f(R
′|A) =
f(R′). Since {b, c} is also a component in R′, composition-consistency implies that λpλ +
(1 − λ)c ∈ f(R′) = f(R′|A) ×b f(R
′|{b,c}). Observe that λp
λ
a = p
λ2
a and hence p
λ2 ∈
f(R′|A) = f(R).
Applying this argument repeatedly, we get pλ
2k
∈ f(R) for all k ∈ N. Since λ2
k
→ 0 for
k →∞ and f is continuous, we get p0 = b ∈ f(R). Similarly, it follows that p1 = a ∈ f(R).
The fact that f is convex-valued implies that f(R) = ∆(A).
The characterization of ML for agendas of size 2 proceeds along the following lines. By
unanimity, neutrality, and Lemma 4, we know which lotteries have to be returned by every
composition-consistent PSCF for three particular profiles. Then population-consistency
implies that every such PSCF has to return all maximal lotteries. Last, we again use
population-consistency to show that the function is not decisive if it additionally returns
lotteries that are not maximal.
Lemma 5. Let f be a PSCF that satisfies population-consistency and composition-
consistency and A = {a, b}. Then f(R) = ML(R) for every R ∈ R|A.
Proof. First, note that R ∈ R|A is fully determined by R(a, b). Let R ∈ R|A be the profile
such that R(a, b) = 1/2. Since f(R) 6= ∅, there is λ ∈ [0, 1] such that pλ ∈ f(R). Neutrality
implies that p1−λ ∈ f(R) and hence, by convexity of f(R), p1/2 = 1/2 (pλ + p1−λ) ∈ f(R).
If follows from Lemma 4 that f(R) = ∆(A).
Now, let R ∈ R|A be the profile such that R(a, b) = 1. Unanimity implies that a ∈ f(R).
By population-consistency and the first part of the proof, we get a ∈ f(R′) for all R′ ∈ R|A
with R′(a, b) ∈ [1/2, 1]. Similarly, b ∈ f(R′) for all R′ ∈ R|A with R
′(a, b) ∈ [0, 1/2]. This
already shows that ML(R) ⊆ f(R) for every R ∈ R|A.
Finally, let R ∈ R|A be a profile such that R(a, b) = r > 1/2. If f(R) 6= {a}, there is
λ ∈ [0, 1) such that pλ ∈ f(R). We have shown before that f(R′) = ∆(A) if R′(a, b) = 1/2.
Hence, it follows from population-consistency that pλ ∈ f(R′) for every R′ ∈ R|A with
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R′(a, b) ∈ [1/2, r]. But then {R ∈ R|A : R(a, b) ∈ [1/2, r]} ⊆ {R ∈ R|A : |f(R)| > 1} and
hence, {R ∈ R|A : |f(R)| = 1} is not dense in R|A. This contradicts decisiveness of f . An
analogous argument shows that f(R) = {b} whenever R(a, b) < 1/2.
In summary, we have that f(R) = {a} if R(a, b) ∈ (1/2, 1], f(R) = {b} if R(a, b) ∈ [0, 1/2),
and f(R) = ∆(A) if R(a, b) = 1/2. Thus, f = ML (as depicted in Figure 1(a)).
C.3. f ⊆ ML
The first lemma in this section shows that every PSCF that satisfies population-consistency
and composition-consistency is Condorcet-consistent for profiles that are close to the uni-
form profile uni(L(A)), i.e., the profile in which every preference relation is assigned the
same fraction of voters. We prove this statement by induction on the number of alterna-
tives. Every profile close to the uniform profile that admits a Condorcet winner can be
written as a convex combination of profiles that have a component and admit the same
Condorcet winner. For these profiles we know from the induction hypothesis that the
Condorcet winner has to be chosen.
Lemma 6. Let f be a PSCF that satisfies population-consistency and composition-
consistency and A ∈ F(U). Then, f satisfies Condorcet-consistency in a neighborhood
of the uniform profile uni(L(A)).
Proof. Let f be a PSCF that satisfies population-consistency and composition-consistency
and A ∈ F(U) with |A| = n. Let, furthermore, R ∈ R|A be such that a ∈ A is a Condorcet
winner in R and ‖R − uni(L(A))‖ ≤ εn = (4
nΠnk=1k!)
−1. We show that a ∈ f(R) by
induction over n. An example for n = 3 illustrating the idea is given after the proof. For
n = 2, the claim follows directly from Lemma 5.
For n > 2, fix b ∈ A \ {a}. First, we introduce some notation. For < ∈ L(A), we denote
by <−1 the preference relation that reverses all pairwise comparisons, i.e., x <−1 y iff y < x
for all x, y ∈ A. By <b→a we denote the preference relation that is identical to < except
that b is moved upwards or downwards (depending on whether a < b or b < a) until it is
next to a in the preference relation. Formally, let
X< =
{
{x ∈ A : a ≻ x ≻ b} if a < b, and
{x ∈ A : b ≻ x ≻ a} if b < a,
and
<
b→a =
{
< \ (X< × {b}) ∪ ({b} ×X<) if a < b, and
< \ ({b} ×X<) ∪ (X< × {b}) if b < a.
Notice that for every <′ ∈ L(A), there are at most n − 1 distinct preference relations <
such that <′ = <b→a. Furthermore, we say that {a, b} is a component in < if X< = ∅.
We first show that composition-consistency implies Condorcet-consistency for a particu-
lar type of profiles. For < ∈ L(A), let S ∈ R|A such that S(<)+S(<)
b→a = S(<−1) = 1/2.
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We have that S(a, x) = 1/2 for all x ∈ A \ {a} and hence, a is a Condorcet winner in S.
We prove that a ∈ f(S) by induction over n. For n = 2, this follows from Lemma 5. For
n > 2, let x ∈ A \ {b} such that x < y for all y ∈ A or y < x for all y ∈ A. This is always
possible since n > 2. Notice that A \ {x} is a component in S and S(x, y) = 1/2 for all
y ∈ A\{x}. If x = a, it follows from composition-consistency and Lemma 5 that a ∈ f(S).
If x 6= a, it follows from the induction hypothesis that a ∈ f(S|A\{x}). Lemma 5 implies
that a ∈ f(S|{a,x}) as S(a, x) = 1/2. Then, it follows from composition-consistency that
a ∈ f(S|{a,x})×a f(S|A\{x}) = f(S).
Now, for every < ∈ L(A) such that {a, b} is not a component in < and 0 < R(<) ≤
R(<−1), let S< ∈ R|A such that
S<(<) + S<(<b→a) = S<(<−1) = 1/2 and S<(<)/S<(<−1) = R(<)/R(<−1).
From what we have shown before, it follows that a ∈ f(S<) for all < ∈ L(A).
The rest of the proof proceeds as follows. We show that R can be written as a convex
combination of profiles of the type S< and a profile R′ in which {a, b} is a component and
a is a Condorcet winner. Since R is close to the uniform profile, R(<′) is almost identical
for all preference relations <′. Hence S<(<′) is close to 0 for all preference relations <′ in
which {a, b} is a component. As a consequence, R′(<′) is almost identical for all preference
relations <′ in which {a, b} is a component and R′|A\{b} is close to the uniform profile for
n−1 alternatives, i.e., uni(L(A\{b})). By the induction hypothesis, a ∈ f(R′|A\{b}). Since
{a, b} is a component in R′, it follows from composition-consistency that a ∈ f(R′).
We define
S = 2
∑
<
R(<−1)S<,
where the sum is taken over all < such that {a, b} is not a component in < and 0 < R(<) ≤
R(<−1) (in case R(<) = R(<−1) we pick one of < and <−1 arbitrarily). Now, let R′ ∈ R|A
such that
R = (1− ‖S‖)R′ + S.
Note that, by definition of S, R′(<) = 0 for all < ∈ L(A) such that {a, b} is not a
component in <. Hence, {a, b} is a component in R′. By the choice of R, we have that
‖S‖ =
∑
<∈L(A)
S(<) ≤
n!− 2(n− 1)!
n!
+ εn = 1−
2
n
+ εn.
Using this fact, a simple calculation shows that
R′(<) ≤
R(<)− S(<)
2
n − εn
≤
1
n! + εn
2
n − εn
≤
1
2(n − 1)!
+
εn−1
4(n− 1)!
.
Since, for every preference relation < where {a, b} is a component, there is exactly one
other preference relation identical to < except that a and b are swapped, we have that
R′|A\{b}(<) ≤
1
(n− 1)!
+
εn−1
2(n − 1)!
,
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for every < ∈ L(A \ {b}). By the above calculation, we have that∥∥R′|A\{b} − uni(L(A \ {b}))∥∥ ≤ εn−1.
Since S<(a, x) = 1/2 for all x ∈ A \ {a} and < ∈ L(A), we have that R′(a, x) ≥ 1/2 for all
x ∈ A \ {a}. Thus, a is a Condorcet winner in R′|A\{b}. From the induction hypothesis it
follows that a ∈ f(R′|A\{b}). Using the fact that R
′(a, b) ≥ 1/2, Lemma 5 implies that a ∈
f(R′|{a,b}). Finally, composition-consistency entails a ∈ f(R
′|A\{b})×a f(R
′|{a,b}) = f(R
′).
In summary, a ∈ f(S<) for all < ∈ L(A) and a ∈ f(R′). Since R is a convex combination
of profiles of the type S< and R′, it follows from population-consistency that a ∈ f(R).
We now give an example for A = {a, b, c} which illustrates the proof of Lemma 6.
Consider the following profile R, where 0 ≤ ε ≤ ε3.
(1+2ε)/6 1/6 1/6 (1−ε)/6 (1−ε)/6 1/6
a a b b c c
b c a c a b
c b c a b a
R
Then, we have that ‖R − uni(L(A))‖ ≤ ε3. Now consider < with b ≻ c ≻ a, which yields
S< as depicted below.
1/2 (1−ε)/2 ε/2
a b c
c c b
b a a
S<
Here, y < a for all y ∈ A. Hence, it follows from what we have shown before that a ∈ f(S<).
No other profiles of this type need to be considered, as < and <−1 are the only preference
relations in which {a, b} is not a component. Thus S = 1/3S<.
Then, we have R′, R′|{a,c}, and R
′|{a,b} as follows.
(1+2ε)/4 1/4 (1−ε)/4 (1−ε)/4
a b c c
b a a b
c c b a
R′
(1+ε)/2 (1−ε)/2
a c
c a
R′|{a,c}
(2+ε)/4 (2−ε)/4
a b
b a
R′|{a,b}
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It follows from Lemma 5 that a ∈ f(R′|{a,c}) and a ∈ f(R
′|{a,b}). Then, composition-
consistency implies that a ∈ f(R′) = f(R′|{a,c})×a f(R
′|{a,b}).
In summary, we have that
R = 2/3R′ + 1/3S<,
a ∈ f(R′), and a ∈ f(S<). Thus, population-consistency implies that a ∈ f(R).
Lemma 7. Every PSCF that satisfies population-consistency and composition-consistency
returns the uniform lottery over all Condorcet winners for all profiles in a neighborhood of
the uniform profile uni(L(A)).
Proof. Let f be a PSCF that satisfies population-consistency and composition-consistency
and A ∈ F(U) with |A| = n. Moreover, let R ∈ R|A such that ‖R − uni(L(A))‖ ≤ εn and
A′ ⊆ A be the set of Condorcet winners in R. We actually prove a stronger statement,
namely that ∆(A′) ⊆ f(R). Every alternative in A′ is a Condorcet winner in R. Thus, it
follows from Lemma 6 that x ∈ f(R) for every x ∈ A′. Since f(R) is convex, ∆(A′) ⊆ f(R)
follows.
For the remainder of the proof, we need to define two classes of profiles that are based
on regularity conditions imposed on the corresponding majority margins. Let A ∈ F(U)
and A′ ⊆ A. A profile R ∈ R|A is
regular on A′ if
∑
y∈A′
MR(x, y) = 0 for all x ∈ A
′, and
strongly regular on A′ if MR(x, y) = 0 for all x, y ∈ A
′.
By R|A
′
A and S|
A′
A we denote the set of all profiles in R|A that are regular or strongly regular
on A′, respectively.
In the following five lemmas we show that, for every A′ ⊆ A, every profile on A can be
affinely decomposed into profiles of three different types: profiles that are strongly regular
on A′, certain regular profiles, and profiles that admit a strict Condorcet winner in A′.21
Lemmas 8, 9, and 10 do not make any reference to population-consistency, composition-
consistency, or maximal lotteries and may be of independent interest.
First, we determine the dimension of the space of all profiles that are strongly regular
on A′.
Lemma 8. Let A′ ⊆ A ∈ F(U). Then, dim(S|A
′
A ) = |A|! −
(
|A′|
2
)
− 1.
Proof. We will characterize S|A
′
A using a set of linear constraints. By definition, S|
A′
A =
{R ∈ R|A : MR(x, y) = 0 for all x, y ∈ A
′}. Recall that MR(x, y) =
∑
< : x<y R(<) −∑
< : y<xR(<). Since MR(x, x) = 0 for all R ∈ R|A and x ∈ A, S|
A′
A can be characterized
by
( |A|′
2
)
homogeneous linear constraints in the (|A|! − 1)-dimensional space R|A, which
21Similar decompositions of majority margin matrices have been explored by Zwicker (1991) and Saari
(1995).
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implies that dim(S|A
′
A ) ≥ |A|! −
( |A|′
2
)
− 1. Equality holds but is not required for the
following arguments. We therefore omit the proof.
Second, we determine the dimension of the space of all skew-symmetric n × n matrices
that correspond to regular profiles and vanish outside their upper left n′ × n′ sub-matrix,
i.e.,
Mn′ =
{
M ∈ Qn×n : M = −MT ,
n∑
j=1
M(i, j) = 0 if i ∈ [n], and M(i, j) = 0 if {i, j} 6⊆ [n′]
}
.
In Lemma 10, we then proceed to show that every matrix of this type can be decomposed
into matrices induced by a subset of regular profiles for which we know that every PSCF has
to return the uniform lottery over the first n′ alternatives (possibly among other lotteries).
Lemma 9. dim(Mn′) =
( n′
2
)
− (n′ − 1).
Proof. First note that the space of all n × n matrices has dimension n2. We show that
Mn′ can be characterized by a set of (n
2 − (n′)2) + (
( n′
2
)
+ n′) + (n′ − 1) homogeneous
linear constraints. Let M ∈ Qn×n and observe that (n2 − (n′)2) constraints are needed to
ensure that M vanishes outside of [n′] × [n′],
( n′
2
)
+ n′ constraints are needed to ensure
skew-symmetry of M on [n′] × [n′], i.e., M(i, j) = −M(j, i) for all i, j ∈ [n′], j ≥ i, and
(n′−1) constraints are needed to ensure that the first n′ rows (and hence also the columns)
of M ′ sum up to 0, i.e.,
∑n
j=1M(i, j) = 0 for all i ∈ [n
′−1]. It follows from skew-symmetry
and the latter n′ − 1 constraints that the n′th row of M sums up to 0, since
n∑
j=1
M(n′, j) =
n∑
i,j=1
M(i, j) −
n′−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
M(i, j) = 0.
The last n− n′ rows of M trivially sum up to 0. Hence, dim(Mn′) ≥ (n
′)2 − (
( n′
2
)
+ n′)−
(n′ − 1) =
(
n′
2
)
− (n′ − 1). Equality holds but is not required for the following arguments.
We therefore omit the proof.
Let Π◦B([n]) be the set of all permutations that are cyclic on B and coincide with the
identity permutation outside of B.22 We denote by M◦n′ the space of all matrices in Mn′
induced by a permutation in Π◦B([n]) for some B ⊆ [n
′], i.e.,
M◦n′ =
{
M ∈Mn′ : M(i, j) =


1 if j = π(i), i ∈ B,
−1 if i = π(j), j ∈ B,
0 otherwise,
for some π ∈ Π◦B([n]), B ⊆ [n
′]
}
,
with the convention that M◦2 = {0}. We now show that the linear hull of M
◦
n′ is Mn′ .
22A permutation pi ∈ Π([n]) is cyclic on B if pi|B| is the smallest positive power of pi that is the identity
function on B.
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Lemma 10. lin(M◦n′) = Mn′ .
Proof. The idea underlying the proof is as follows: every matrix M ∈ Mn′ corresponds to
a weighted directed graph with vertex set [n] where the weight of the edge from i to j is
M(i, j). If M 6= 0, there exists a cycle along edges with positive weight of length at least 3
in the subgraph induced by [n′]. We obtain a matrix M ′ with smaller norm than M by
subtracting the matrix in M◦n′ from M that corresponds to the cycle identified before.
LetM ∈Mn′ and κ ∈ Q\{0} such that κM ∈ N
n×n. We show, by induction over κ‖M‖,
that M =
∑ℓ
i=1 λiM
i for some λi ∈ Q and M
i ∈ M◦n′ for all i ∈ [ℓ] \ {1} for some ℓ ∈ N.
If κ‖M‖ = 0 then M = 0. Hence, the induction hypothesis is trivial.
If κ‖M‖ 6= 0, i.e., M 6= 0, we can find B ⊆ [n′] with |B| ≥ 3 and π ∈ Π◦B([n]) such that
M(i, j) > 0 if π(i) = j and i ∈ B. Note that π defines a cycle of length at least 3 in the
graph that corresponds to M . We define M1 ∈M◦n′ by letting
M1(i, j) =


1 if π(i) = j and i ∈ B,
−1 if π(j) = i and j ∈ B, and
0 otherwise.
Let λ = min{M(i, j) : i, j ∈ [n] and M1(i, j) > 0} and M ′ = M − λM1. By construction,
we have that M ′(i, j) = M(i, j)−λ if π(i) = j and i ∈ B, M ′(i, j) = M(i, j)+λ if π(j) = i
and j ∈ B, and M ′(i, j) = M(i, j) otherwise. Note that M(i, j) ≥ λ if π(i) = j and i ∈ B
and M(i, j) ≤ −λ if π(j) = i and j ∈ B by definition of λ. Recall that κM ∈ Nn×n and, in
particular, κλ ∈ N. Hence, κM ′ ∈ Nn×n. Moreover, κ‖M ′‖ = κ‖M‖−2κλ|B| ≤ κ‖M‖−1.
From the induction hypothesis we know that M ′ =
∑ℓ
i=2 λiM
i with λi ∈ Q and M
i ∈M◦n′
for all i ∈ [ℓ] for some ℓ ∈ N. By construction of M ′, we have that M =
∑ℓ
i=1 λiM
i with
λ1 = λ.
Lemma 11 leverages Lemmas 7, 8, 9, and 10 to show two statements. First, it identifies
the dimension of the space of all profiles that are regular on A′ ⊆ A. Second, it proves that
there is a full-dimensional subset of the space of all profiles that are regular on A′ for which
every PSCF that satisfies population-consistency and composition-consistency returns the
uniform lottery over A′.
Lemma 11. Let f be a PSCF that satisfies population-consistency and composition-
consistency and A′ ⊆ A ∈ F(U). Then, there is X ⊆ R|A
′
A of dimension |A|! − |A
′| such
that uni(A′) ∈ f(R) for every R ∈ X.
Proof. To simplify notation, we assume without loss of generality that A = [n] and A′ =
[n′]. For M ∈ Qn×n and π ∈ Π(A), let π(M) be the matrix that results from M by
permuting the rows and columns of M according to π, i.e., (π(M))(i, j) = M(π(i), π(j)).
From Lemma 8 we know that we can find a set S = {S1, . . . , Sn!−(
n′
2 )} ⊆ R|
[n′]
[n] of affinely
independent profiles. Since S can be chosen such that every S ∈ S is close to uni(L([n])),
it follows from Lemma 7 that uni([n′]) ∈ f(S) for all S ∈ S. Therefore, it suffices to find
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a set of profiles T = {R1, . . . , R(
n′
2 )−(n
′−1)} ⊆ R|
[n′]
[n] such that uni([n
′]) ∈ f(R) for every
R ∈ T and S ∪ T is a set of affinely independent profiles. If n′ = 2, we can choose T = ∅.
For n′ ≥ 3 we construct a suitable set of profiles as follows.
For every B ⊆ [n′] with |B| = k ≥ 3 and π ∈ Π◦B([n]), let [n] \ B = {a1, . . . , an−k} and
RπB be defined as follows: R
π
B(<) = 1/(2k) if
π0(i) < π1(i) < π2(i) < . . . < πk−1(i) < a1 < . . . < an−k or
an−k < . . . < a1 < π
k−1(i) < . . . < π2(i) < π0(i) < π1(i),
for some i ∈ B. Note that RπB is regular on [n
′], since
RπB(i, j) =


λ if π(i) = j and i ∈ B,
−λ if π(j) = i and j ∈ B, and
0 otherwise,
where λ = 1/k > 0. Hence, for every M ∈ M◦n′ , there are B ⊆ [n
′] and π ∈ Π◦B([n]) such
that λM = MRpi
B
. Notice that B and [n]\B are components in RπB . For j ∈ B, we have by
construction that RπB(j, a1) = 0. Hence, it follows from Lemma 5 that j ∈ f(R
π
B |{j,a1}) and
a1 ∈ f(R
π
B|{j,a1}). Moreover, neutrality, convexity, and composition-consistency imply that
uni(B) ∈ f(RπB) by the symmetry of R
π
B with respect to B. Now let ai ∈ {a1, . . . , an−k}.
Observe that {a1, . . . , ai−1} is a component in R
π
B and R
π
B(a1, ai) = 0. Thus, composition-
consistency and Lemma 5 imply that
ai ∈ f(R
π
B |{a1,ai})×a1 f(R
π
B|{a1,...,ai−1}) = f(R
π
B|{1,...,i}).
Furthermore, {ai+1, . . . , an−k} is a component in R
π
B and R
π
B(ai, an−k) = 0. As before, we
get
ai ∈ f(R
π
B|{ai,an−k})×an−k f(R
π
B|{ai+1,...,an−k}) = f(R
π
B |{i,...,n−k}).
Also {ai, . . . , an−k} is a component in R
π
B and thus,
ai ∈ f(R
π
B |{a1,...,ai})×ai f(R
π
B|{ai,...,an−k}) = f(R
π
B|[n]\B).
As B is a component in S and RπB(j, a1) = 0, we get
ai ∈ f(R
π
B|{j,a1,...,ai})×j f(R
π
B|B) = f(R
π
B).
Then, it follows from convexity of f(RπB) that
uni([n′]) =
k
n′
uni(B) +
1
n′
∑
ai∈[n′]\B
ai ∈ f(R
π
B),
since uni(B) ∈ f(RπB) and ai ∈ f(R
π
B) for every i ∈ [n− k].
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We know from Lemma 10 that lin(M◦n′) = Mn′ and, by Lemma 9, dim(M
◦
n′) ≥
( n′
2
)
−(n′−
1). Thus, we can find a basis {M1, . . . ,M(
n′
2 )−(n
′−1)} of M◦n′ and a set of corresponding
profiles
T = {R1, . . . , R(
n′
2 )−(n
′−1)} ⊆ {RπB : B ⊆ [n
′] and π ∈ Π◦B}.
We claim that S ∪ T is a set of affinely independent profiles. Let S1, . . . , Sl ∈ S and
R1, . . . , Rm ∈ S be pairwise disjoint. Assume that
∑
i λiS
i +
∑
j µjR
j = 0 for some
λi, µj ∈ Q such that
∑
i λi +
∑
j µj = 0. This implies that
∑
j µjM
j = 0, which in
turn implies µj = 0 for all j ∈ [m], since the M
j ’s are linearly independent. Hence,∑
i λiS
i = 0 and
∑
i λi = 0, which implies that λi = 0 for all i ∈ [l], since S
1, . . . , Sn!−(
n′
2 )
are affinely independent. Thus, S∪T is a set of affinely independent profiles and dim(S∪T) =
|S ∪ T| − 1 = n!− n′. The above stated fact that uni([n′]) ∈ f(RπB) for every B ⊆ [n
′] and
π ∈ Π◦B([n
′]) finishes the proof.
We now consider PSCFs that may return a lottery that is not maximal. The following
lemma shows that for every such PSCF there is a set of profiles with a strict Condorcet
winner for which it returns the uniform lottery over a fixed subset of alternatives if we addi-
tionally require population-consistency and composition-consistency. Furthermore, this set
of profiles has only one regular profile in its linear hull. Later this statement is leveraged to
show that every population-consistent and composition-consistent PSCF returns a subset
of maximal lotteries.
Lemma 12. Let f be a PSCF that satisfies population-consistency and composition-
consistency. If f 6⊆ ML, there are A′ ⊆ A ∈ F(U) and Y ⊆ R|A of dimension |A
′| − 1
such that uni(A′) ∈ f(R) for every R ∈ Y and dim(lin(Y) ∩ lin(R|A
′
A )) = 1.
Proof. If f 6⊆ ML, there are A ∈ F(U), R ∈ R|A, and p ∈ f(R) such that p 6∈ ML(R).
Since p is not a maximal lottery, by definition, there is q ∈ ∆(A) such that qTMRp > 0.
Linearity of matrix multiplication implies that there is x ∈ A such that (MRp)x > 0, where
(MRp)x is the entry of MRp corresponding to x. We first use composition-consistency to
“blow up” alternatives such that the resulting lottery is uniform. Let κ be the greatest
common divisor of {py : y ∈ A}, i.e., κ = max{s ∈ Q : py/s ∈ N for all y ∈ A}. For
every y ∈ A, let Ay ∈ F(U) such that |Ay| = max{1, py/κ}, Ay ∩ A = {y}, and all Ay
are pairwise disjoint. Moreover, let Au =
⋃
y∈AAy. Now, choose R
u ∈ R|Au such that
Ru|A = R, Ay is a component in R
u for every y ∈ A, and Ru|Ay = uni(L(Ay)) for every
y ∈ Ay. Hence, uni(Ay) ∈ f(R
u|Ay) for all y ∈ A as f is neutral and f(R
u|Ay) is convex.
To simplify notation, let Ap =
⋃
y∈supp(p)Ay. By composition-consistency, it follows that
p′ = uni(Ap) ∈ f(Ru). Observe that
(MRup
′)x =
∑
y∈supp(p)\{x}
|Ay|
|Ap|
MRu(x, y) =
∑
y∈A\{x}
pyMR(x, y) > 0.
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We now construct a profile R′ ∈ R|Au such that x is a strict Condorcet winner in R
′ and
uni(Ap) ∈ f(R′). To this end, let R′ ∈ R|Au be the uniform mixture of all profiles that
arise from Ru by permuting all alternatives in Ap \ {x}, i.e.,
R′ =
1
|Ap \ {x}|!
∑
π∈Π(Au) : π(y)=y
for all y∈Au\Ap∪{x}
π(Ru).
Then, MR′(x, y) = MR′(x, z) > 0 for all y, z ∈ A
p \ {x}. Neutrality and population-
consistency imply that p′ ∈ f(R′).
Let Runi = uni(L(Au)) and define, for λ ∈ [0, 1],
Rλ = λR′ + (1− λ)Runi.
It follows from Lemma 6 that y ∈ f(Runi) for all y ∈ Au. Convexity of f(Runi) implies
that f(Runi) = ∆(Au). Hence, by population-consistency, p′ ∈ f(Rλ) for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
Now, let S ∈ R|Au such that MS(y, z) = 0 for all y, z ∈ A
p ∪ {x} and MS(y, z) = 1 for
all y ∈ Ap ∪ {x}, z ∈ Au \ (Ap ∪ {x}). For λ ∈ [0, 1], let
Sλ = λS + (1− λ)Runi.
Note that every y ∈ Ap ∪ {x} is a Condorcet winner in Sλ. It follows from population-
consistency and Lemma 6 that, for small λ > 0, y ∈ f(Sλ) for all y ∈ Ap ∪ {x} and, by
convexity of ∆(Ap ∪ {x}) ⊆ f(Sλ). In particular, p′ ∈ f(Sλ) for small λ > 0.
Finally, let
Rx = 1/3Rλ + 2/3Sλ,
for some small λ > 0. Population-consistency implies that p′ ∈ f(Rx). Moreover,
MRx(x, y) > 0 for all y ∈ A
u \ {x}, i.e., x is a strict Condorcet winner in Rx, and hence,
it follows from Lemma 6 that x ∈ f(Rx).
If px > 0 then, by construction, p
′ = uni(Ap ∪ {x}) ∈ f(Rx). If px = 0 then p
′ =
uni(Ap) ∈ f(Rx). In this case it follows from convexity of f(Rx) that uni(Ap ∪ {x}) =
1/(|Ap|+1)x+ |Ap|/(|Ap|+1)uni(Ap) ∈ f(Rx).
Hence, in either case, we get a profile Rx such that uni(Ap∪{x}) ∈ f(Rx) andMx = MRx
restricted to Ap ∪ {x} takes the form
Mx = λ ·


0 . . . 0 −1 0 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 −1 0 . . . 0
1 . . . 1 0 1 . . . 1
0 . . . 0 −1 0 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 −1 0 . . . 0


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for some λ > 0 where all entries except the xth row and column are zero. Let n′ =
|Ap ∪ {x}|. For every y ∈ Ap, let My ∈ Qn
′×n′ such that My(y, z) = −My(z, y) = λ for
all z 6= y and 0 otherwise. Let πy ∈ Π(Au) such that πy(x) = y and πy(z) = z for all
z ∈ Au \ (Ap ∪ {x}) and Ry = πy(Rx). Then, for every y ∈ Ap ∪ {x}, MRy = M
y and, by
neutrality, uni(Ap ∪ {x}) ∈ f(Ry).
Let Y = {Ry : y ∈ Ap ∪ {x}}. We have that dim(Y) = |Ap ∪ {x}| − 1 since Y is a
set of affinely independent vectors. Now we determine dim(lin(Y) ∩ lin(R|
Ap∪{x}
Au )). To
this end, let λR ∈ lin(Y) ∩ lin(R|
Ap∪{x}
Au ) with λ ∈ Q and R ∈ R|Au . Then λMR =∑
z∈Ap∪{x} λzM
z and λ
∑
z∈Ap∪{x}MR(y, z) = 0 for all y ∈ A
p ∪ {x}. This implies that
(n′ − 1)λy =
∑
z∈Ap∪{x}\{y} λ
z for all y ∈ Ap ∪ {x}. Hence, λy = λz for all y, z ∈ Ap ∪ {x}
and lin(Y) ∩ lin(R|
Ap∪{x}
Au ) = {λ
∑
y∈Ap∪{x}R
y : λ ∈ Q}.
In Lemma 13, we finally show that every PSCF that satisfies population-consistency
and composition-consistency has to yield maximal lotteries. The structure of the proof is
as follows. We assume for contradiction that a PSCF satisfies population-consistency and
composition-consistency, but returns a lottery that is not maximal. Then we can find a
set of profiles with full dimension for which the uniform lottery over a fixed subset of at
least two alternatives is returned and the uniform profile is in its interior. Thus, this set
contains a profile with a strict Condorcet winner that is close to the uniform profile. For
every profile in an ε-ball around this strict Condorcet profile, the function has to return
the uniform lottery over a non-singleton subset as well as the lottery with probability 1 on
the Condorcet winner, which contradicts decisiveness.
Lemma 13. Every PSCF f that satisfies population-consistency and composition-
consistency has to yield maximal lotteries, i.e., f ⊆ ML.
Proof. Let f be a PSCF that satisfies population-consistency and composition-consistency
and A ∈ F(U). For |A| = 2 the statement follows from Lemma 5. For |A| > 2, assume
for contradiction that f 6⊆ ML. By Lemma 12, there is A′ ⊆ A and Y ⊆ R|A of dimension
|A′| − 1 such that uni(A′) ∈ f(R) for every R ∈ Y and lin(Y) ∩ lin(R|A
′
A ) has dimension
1. By Lemma 11, there is X ⊆ R|A
′
A of dimension |A|! − |A
′| such that uni(A′) ∈ f(R) for
every R ∈ X. Since 0 6∈ X and 0 6∈ Y, lin(X) has dimension |A|! − |A′| + 1 and lin(Y) has
dimension |A′|. Thus, lin(X∪Y) has dimension |A|!. This implies that X∪Y has dimension
|A|!− 1.
Furthermore, it follows from population-consistency that uni(A′) ∈ f(R) for every R ∈
conv(X ∪ Y). Since uni(L(A)) is in the interior of conv(X ∪ Y), there are x ∈ A′ and
Rx ∈ intR|A(X ∪ Y) such that x is a strict Condorcet winner in R
x. Hence, there is ε > 0
such that, for every R′ ∈ Bε(R
x)∩R|A, R
′ ∈ conv(X∪Y) and x is a strict Condorcet winner
in R′. Then, we get that x ∈ f(R′) and uni(A′) ∈ f(R′) for every R′ ∈ Bε(R
x) ∩ R|A.
Thus, {R′ ∈ R|A : |f(R
′, A)| = 1} is not dense in R|A at R
x. This contradicts decisiveness
of f .
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C.4. ML ⊆ f
In this section we show that every PSCF f that satisfies population-consistency and
composition-consistency has to yield all maximal lotteries. To this end, we first prove
an auxiliary lemma. It was shown by McGarvey (1953) that every complete and anti-
symmetric relation is the majority relation of some profile with a bounded number of
voters. We show an analogous statement for skew-symmetric matrices and fractional pref-
erence profiles.
Lemma 14. Let M ∈ Qn×n be a skew-symmetric matrix. Then, there are R ∈ R|[n] and
c ∈ Q>0 such that cM = MR. Furthermore, if there is π ∈ Π([n]) such that M(i, j) =
M(π(i), π(j)) for all i, j ∈ [n], then R = π(R).
Proof. For all i, j ∈ [n] with i 6= j, let Rij ∈ R|[n] be the profile such that R
ij(<) = 1/(n−1)! if
i ≻ j and {i, j} is a component in Rij and Rij(<) = 0 otherwise. By construction, we have
that Rij(i, j) = 1 and Rij(x, y) = 0 for all {x, y} 6= {i, j}. Let c = 1/
∑
i,j : M(i,j)>0M(i, j)
and R = c
∑
i,j : M(i,j)>0M(i, j)R
ij . Then, we have that MR = cM . The second part of
the lemma follows from the symmetry of the construction.
For profiles which admit a unique maximal lottery, it follows from Lemma 13 that f =
ML. It turns out that every maximal lottery that is a vertex of the set of maximal lotteries
in one of the remaining profiles is the limit point of a sequence of maximal lotteries of a
sequence of profiles with a unique maximal lottery converging to the original profile. The
proof of Lemma 15 heavily relies on the continuity of f .
Lemma 15. Let f be a PSCF that satisfies population-consistency and composition-
consistency. Then, ML ⊆ f .
Proof. Let f be a PSCF that satisfies population-consistency and composition-consistency,
A ∈ F(U), and R ∈ R|A. If follows from Lemma 13 that f ⊆ ML. By neutrality, we can
assume without loss of generality that A = [n] and for simplicity M = MR. We want
to show that f(R) = ML(R). If ML(R) is a singleton, it follows from f ⊆ ML that
f(R) = ML(R). Hence, consider the case where ML(R) is not a singleton. Let p ∈ ML(R)
and assume with loss of generality that supp(p) = [k].
We first consider the case where k is odd. By Lemma 14, there are S ∈ R|A and c ∈ Q>0
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such that
MS = c


0 − 1p1p2 0 . . . 0
1
pkp1
1 . . . 1
1
p1p2 . . .
0
...
. . .
...0 . . .
...
... . . .
0
0 − 1pk−1pk
− 1pkp1 0 . . . 0
1
pk−1pk
0 1 . . . 1
−1 . . . −1 0 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
−1 . . . −1 0 . . . 0


Intuitively, MS defines a weighted cycle on [k]. Note that (p
TMS)i = 0 for all i ∈ supp(p)
and (pTMS)i > 0 for all i ∈ A \ supp(p), i.e., p is a quasi-strict maximin strategy in MS
in the sense of Harsanyi (1973b). Since p is a maximin strategy in MS , it follows that
p ∈ ML(S). For ε ∈ [0, 1], we define Rε = (1 − ε)R + εS and M ε = MRε . Population-
consistency implies that p ∈ ML(Rε) for all ε ∈ [0, 1]. Observe that p is a quasi-strict
maximin strategy in M ε for every ε ∈ (0, 1]. Hence, for every maximin strategy q in M ε,
it follows that (qTM ε)i = 0 for every i ∈ [k] and qi = 0 for every i 6∈ [k]. It follows from
basic linear algebra that
det
(
(MS(i, j))i,j∈[k−1]
)
= ck−1
k−2∏
i=1
(
1
pipi+1
)2
6= 0,
and hence, (MS(i, j))i,j∈[k] has rank at least k−1. More precisely, (MS(i, j))i,j∈[k] has rank
k − 1, since skew-symmetric matrices of odd size cannot have full rank.23 Furthermore,
det((M ε(i, j))i,j∈[k−1]) is a polynomial in ε of order at most k − 1 and hence, has at most
k − 1 zeros. Thus, we can find a sequence (εl)l∈N which converges to zero such that
(M εl(i, j))i,j∈[k] has rank k − 1 for all l ∈ N. In particular, if (q
TM ε)i = 0 for all i ∈ [k],
then q = p. This implies that p is the unique maximin strategy in M εl for all l ∈ N and
hence, {p} = ML(Rεl) ⊆ f(Rεl) for all l ∈ N. It follows from continuity of f that p ∈ f(R).
Now we consider the case where k is even. ML(R) is a polytope because it is the solution
space of a linear feasibility program. Assume that p is a vertex of ML(R). We first show
that p is not quasi-strict.24 Assume for contradiction that p is quasi-strict, i.e., (pTM)i > 0
for all i 6∈ [k]. Then, supp(q) ⊆ [k] for every maximin strategy q ofM . But then (1+ε)p−εq
is also a maximin strategy in M for small ε > 0 as p is a quasi-strict maximin strategy in
M . This contradicts the assumption that p is a vertex of ML(R).
23A skew-symmetric matrix M of odd size cannot have full rank, since det(M) = det(MT ) = det(−M) =
(−1)n det(M) = − det(M) and, hence, det(M) = 0.
24The proof of this statement does not make use of the fact that k is even and therefore also holds (but is
not needed) for odd k.
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Hence, we may assume without loss of generality that (pTM)k+1 = 0. Let e1 = M(k +
1, 1)/p2 and ei = (M(k+1, i) + pi−1ei−1)/pi+1 for i ∈ {2, . . . , k− 1}. By Lemma 14, there
are S ∈ R|A and c ∈ Q>0 such that
MS = c


0 e1 0 . . . 0 0 1 . . . 1
−e1
. . .
...
... ...
. . .
...0
. . . 0
...
. . . ek−1
0 . . . 0 −ek−1 0 0
0 . . . 0 0 1 . . . 1
−1 . . . −1 0 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
−1 . . . −1 0 . . . 0


Note that MS(1, k) = MS(k, 1) = 0. For ε > 0, let R
ε = (1−ε)R+εS and M ε = MRε . We
claim that pε defined as follows is a maximin strategy in M ε. To this end, let sε =
εc
1−ε+εc .
pεi =


(1− sε)pi if i ∈ [k],
sε if i = k + 1, and
0 otherwise.
Note that 1/c (pTMS)1 = −p2e1 = −M(k + 1, 1) and, for i ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1},
1
c
(pTMS)i = pi−1ei−1 − pi+1ei = pi−1ei−1 − (M(k + 1, i) + pi−1ei−1) = −M(k + 1, i).
To determine (pTMS)k, we first prove inductively that piei = 1/pi+1
∑i
j=1M(k+1, j)pj for
all i ∈ [k − 1]. For i = 1, this follows from the definition of e1. Now, let i ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}.
Then,
piei =
pi
pi+1
(M(k + 1, i) + pi−1ei−1) =
pi
pi+1
(M(k + 1, i) +
1
pi
i−1∑
j=1
M(k + 1, j)pj)
=
1
pi+1
i∑
j=1
M(k + 1, j)pj ,
where the second equality follows from the induction hypothesis. Now,
1
c
(pTMS)k = pk−1ek−1 =
1
pk
k−1∑
j=1
M(k + 1, j)pj = −
1
pk
M(k + 1, k)pk = −M(k + 1, k),
where the third equality follows from the fact that (pTM)k+1 = 0.
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For i ∈ [k], it follows from (pTM)i = 0 that ((p
ε)TM)i = sεM(k+1, i). Then, for i ∈ [k],
((pε)TM ε)i = (1− ε)sεM(k + 1, i) + εc(1 − sε)(−M(k + 1, i)) = 0.
Furthermore, it follows from (pTM)k+1 = 0 that ((p
ε)TM ε)k+1 = 0 as M(k+1, k+1) = 0,
and, for i ∈ A \ [k + 1],
((pε)TM ε)i ≥ (1− ε)sεM(k + 1, i) + εc ≥ −(1− ε)sε + εc > 0.
This shows that pε is a maximin strategy in M ε and hence, pε ∈ ML(Rε). Since |supp(pε)|
is odd, it follows from the first case that pε ∈ f(Rε). Note that sε goes to 0 as ε goes to 0.
Hence, pε goes to p as ε goes to 0. It now follows from continuity of f that p ∈ f(R).
Together, we have that p ∈ f(R) for every vertex p of ML(R). Since every lottery in
ML(R) can be written as a convex combination of vertices, convexity of f(R) implies that
f(R) = ML(R).
Theorem 2 then follows directly from Lemmas 13 and 15.
Theorem 2. A PSCF f satisfies population-consistency and composition-consistency if
and only if f = ML.
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